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NOTES

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CLASSIFYING CORPORATE
DIRECTORS IN PENNSYLVANIA
Recent developments in the field of Corporation Law have cast doubts upon
the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's statutory provision for classification of
directors. Section 403 of the Business Corporation Law of 1933 provides that:
"If the articles or by laws of a business corporation so provide,
the directors of the corporation may be classified in respect to the time
for which they shall severally hold office . .

.-

This is a slight modification of the Act of 18872 which permitted classification of directors by a majority vote of shareholders without requiring the articles or by-laws to provide for such classification. Thus, classification of directors has been permitted in one form or another ever since 1887. This is so,
even though the Constitution of 1874, as reiterated in the Business Corporation Law of 1933 makes cumulative voting mandatory. 8 Standing side by side
for sixty-eight years, these two provisions have not been overruled even though
they are inconsistent.
The purpose of cumulative voting is to give minority shareholders representation on the board of directors and thus serve as a check on majority control. 4 But, when directors are classified, the benefits derived from cumulative

voting are emasculated. For example, on a five man board of directors, under
cumulative voting a minority holding only one-fifth of the shares is practically
assured representation. But, if this same board is divided into two classes, one
consisting of three directors and the other two, one-third of the shares would
be required for the same assurance.
In the recent case of Wolfson v. Avery5 the Supreme Court of Illinois was
faced with a constitutional provision guaranteeing cumulative voting and a
statutory authorization of classification of directors. The latter was declared to
be unconstitutional. This provision gave stockholders the right to vote for ". ..
as many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected .... ."6

The appellants argued that "to be elected" referred to those elected at that
particular time, rather than to the entire board and thus less than the whole
board could be elected at one time. The court disagreed. In refusing to accept
the meaning of the words "to be elected" ascribed to them by the appellant, the
court relied on another sentence of the same constitutional provision which gave
the right, ". . . to cumulate said shares and give one candidate as many votes
1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-403 (Purdon 1955).
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 819-503 (Purdon 1955).
8 PA. CONST. art. 16, § 4 (1874); PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 15 § 2852-505 (Purdon 1938).
4 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 177 (Rev. Ed. 1946); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 530 (2nd ed.
1949); 56 DICK L. REV. 330 (1951) ; 22 U. CH. L. REV. 751 (1955).
5 126 N. E. 2d 701 (Ill. 1955), discussed in 9 MIAMI L. Q. 365 (1955).
6 ILL. CONST. art. 11, § 3 (1870).
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as the number of directors multiplied by the number of his shares ......
The
court said that "number of directors" means the whole number of directors
of the corporation, not the number to be elected at that particular meeting.
Therefore the statutory authorization of classification of directors whereby less
than all could be elected at one time, being inconsistent, was declared to be unconstitutional. The fact that it had been in effect for eighty-three years and
that fifteen Illinois corporations, acting in reliance on it had provided for classification of directors, was tersely disposed of by saying, "Age, however, does
not immunize a statute from constitutional attack".
Turning to the Pennsylvania constitutional provision for cumulative voting, we are again confronted with a problem of philology. It expressly provides that:
"In all elections for directors . . .each . . .shareholder may cast
or distribute them
the whole number of his votes for one candidate
upon two or more candidates as he may prefer." 7
Does this contemplate elections in which all directors are elected at one time,
or elections in which only a certain class of directors are elected? The case of
Hays v. Com., 8 decided two years after passage of the above constitutional provision, strongly suggests the former. In the Hays case, the court, in commenting
on the constitutional cumulative voting provision, says:
"... This section is understood to confer upon the individual stockholder the right to cast all votes which his stock represents, multiplied
by the number of directors . . .to be elected, for a single candidate,
should he think proper so to do . . . . [W]e have no doubt (that) we
have in our statement embodied the intention of the convention." (Emphasis added.)
It is submitted that the number of directors "to be elected" means the whole
board of directors, since classification was not authorized until 1887 (eleven
years after this case).
Although a constitutional provision such as that requiring cumulative voting, is self-executing and does not require legislation to make it effective, 9 the
legislature, in the Business Corporation Law of 193310 provided that:
". .. In all elections for directors, every shareholder entitled to vote
shall have the right . . . to multiply the number of votes to which he

may be entitled by the number of directors to be elected, and he may cast
the whole number of such votes for one candidate or he may distribute
(Emphasis added.)
them among any two or more candidates ......
Thus, the language of the Hays case is brought into the cumulative voting provision, after classification is allowed. Some interesting language was added to
this provision by a 1953 amendment, which provided:"
§ 4 (1874).
8 82 Pa. 518 (1876).
9 Pierce v. Com., 104 Pa. 150 (1883).
15, § 2852-505 (Purdon 1938).
10 PA. STAT. ANN.tit.
15, § 2852-505 (Purdon 1955).
11 PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
7 PA. CoNsT. art. 16
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".. . In all elections for directors, every shareholder entitled to vote
shall have the right . . . to multiply the number of votes to which he
may be entitled by the total number of directors to be elected in the
same election

.

Whether or not this correctly interprets the constitutional provision of 1874,
has never been decided by our courts.
The second jurisdiction to recently resolve a conflict between cumulative
voting and classification of directors in favor of the former, is Ohio. In Humphrys v. Winous Co. 1 2 , the inconsistency was between two sections of the same
statute. There was no constitutional provision involved. In this case, the board
of directors attempted to change the election from three directors elected annually for a one year term, to three classes of directors, one in each class, to be
elected for three year terms, one each year. This would, of course, completely
nullify any advantage to minority stockholders derived from cumulative voting.
Since the statute relating to cumulative voting provided that "Such right to vote
cumulatively shall not be restricted or qualified by any provisions in the article or regulations .... .,'Is the court decided that this language was specific while that relating to classification of directors was general and tfierefore
the former modified the latter. The time element here, during which both sections stood together was a mere twenty-eight years. The court apparently did
not deem this worthy of comment.
In any event, the Wolfson and Humphrys cases focus new light up6n the
controversy between cumulative voting and classification of directors. What
Pennsylvania will do, if anything, is a matter of conjecture.
ROBERT
12 125 N. E. 2d 204 (Ohio 1955).
18 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.58 (Baldwin 1953).
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